Pillars and policies of the transitional phase in The Syrian Wednesday

Damascus has recently witnessed a series of change steps without announcing their goal and the link between them. However, these steps paved the way in one way or another for a political transformation in power and the state, the features of which were not clear before announcing entering a "transitional phase" that linked it to the People's Assembly and the government later without clarifying the features and basic foundations of this "transitional"?! Its orientations?! Its adequacy with the needs of the country, the current circumstances and the needs of the recovery phase, or the extent of its intersection with external and internal political paths in which Syria is directly or indirectly involved?! In addition to the relationship of these transformations with what is happening in the region, and the ambiguity that the world awaits with the change in the US administration.

The series actually began with the issuance of the amnesty decree in 2022, and these transformations extended to the power structure in 2023, with talk for the first time about reconsidering the "role of the state" and the "role of the Baath Party" and separating them, and transforming into a "ruling party". At the level of the military institution, the army officially announced in June 2024 a three-stage timetable for reserve service aimed at "reaching an advanced army that relies on volunteers". On the economic side, the most prominent transformation was the previous government's announcement of the move to lift support and change its mechanisms, and directing the new government to focus on a "productive public sector", after structural transformations in the structure of some public institutions and turning them into "joint-stock companies" as part of a return to adopting the concept of a social market economy. As for what is related to the civil and societal side, work was done to develop a draft of the Social Affairs and Labor Law, with talk of a different organization of the relationship between government institutions and civil institutions, and recently, a move was announced to change trade laws and the relationship with the civil structures of the economic sector.

Damascus has not yet clarified its vision for the transitional phase, the goal of this phase, the foundations on which it is based from its point of view, nor whether the government and the People's Assembly are the only two basic structures that will bear the burden of this "phase". It has also not yet revealed the correlation and causality between the changes that have occurred over the past two years, and the role of the Syrians in these changes, directing them, and monitoring them, especially since this naming of the phase is linked in the Syrian consciousness to the contents of the efforts of the political solution led by the United Nations. This problem has deepened further after the state of lack of clarity about the outcome of the paths of openness to Damascus in particular, whether Arab, Turkish, or European, and after an unprecedented aggression launched by the occupying entity in Lebanon and Syria, which raised the priority of some files such as asylum and others, after it caused the return of an unknown number of Syrian refugees from Lebanon with thousands of displaced people coming as a result of the escalation. Consequently, the need arose to know the extent to which the "transitional phase" that Damascus is talking about is compatible with the requirements of Syrian recovery today.​
The previous set of transformations and others push for the necessity of understanding their title and the interconnectedness between them, the features of the change led by Damascus, its policies and orientations, and the objectives it is working on in the “transitional phase” and the extent of Syrians’ involvement in it, and its compatibility with political paths and recovery strategies, especially since the United Nations launched its strategic plan for early recovery 2024-2028 from Damascus on November 4th. It also shows the need to delve deeper into the role of these measures and their sufficiency in protecting Syria from escalation campaigns in the region, and the essential role assigned to civil society in all of this.
In order to discuss these ideas and outline possible action concepts, the Nation Building Movement held the 80th session of the Syrian Wednesday program to launch a new phase of sessions focusing on the foundations of the transitional phase and its policies under the title “Pillars and Policies of the Transitional Phase.” The session included a group of representatives of political forces, economic and administrative experts, and civil society activists.
The discussion was divided into four pillars:
- The first pillar: Features of the current Syrian change: its starting point and goal.
- The second pillar: The transitional phase: its foundations and social carriers.
- The third pillar: The existing and required transitional phase policies and their mechanisms.
- The fourth pillar: The role of civil society in activating the transitional phase policies. 
The session came out with a basic foundations of the transitional phase that the country needs and built a general vision for the necessary public policy pillars, and some recommendations regarding the features of the upcoming sessions and their main titles.​

More details about the session can be found in the photo reports below.  

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